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Accounting Restatements: Are They Always Bad News for Investors? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study investigates a large sample of financial statement restatements over the 
period 1986-2001, and compares restatements caused by changes in accounting principles 
to those caused by errors. Typically, investors perceive restatements as negative signals 
due to three potential reasons: (i) the restatement indicates problems with the accounting 
system that may be manifestations of broader operational (and managerial) problems, (ii) 
the restatement causes downward revisions in future cash flows expectations, and (iii) the 
restatement indicates managerial attempts to cover up income decline through “cooking 
the books”.  
We provide evidence that market reactions to restatements due to errors are 
generally negative. We show that these restatements come in periods of declining profits 
and lower profits than industry peers for the restating firms, consistent with both 
opportunistic managerial behavior and operational problems. However, investors’ 
reactions to income-increasing restatements due to errors are not different from zero, 
suggesting that the perceived failure of the accounting system is just offset by the upward 
revisions in future cash flow expectations in these cases of income-increasing errors. 
Thus, our combined results show that not all restatements are alike; users of the 
information need to carefully assess the existence and potential effects of the three factors 
that typically cause the downward revisions in stock prices on a case by case basis. 
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Accounting Restatements: Are They Always Bad News for Investors? 
 
1. Introduction 
 The academic accounting literature documents fairly extensively the negative 
impact on equity returns of accounting restatements arising out of accounting errors and 
(possibly, in anticipation of) SEC involvement.1 In recent years, investors began to pay 
particular attention to companies that restate earnings; several sources now track 
restatements (e.g., Wall Street Journal, Huron Consulting Group) and  some services 
began using restatements to assess the quality of earnings (e.g. Criterion LLC). We 
conjecture that the negative market reactions to restatements are caused by the following 
three factors, either singly or in tandem: (i) the downward revision of future cash flows 
expectations induced by the revelation of new information; (ii) the indication that the 
restating company has a weak accounting information (and reporting) system, possibly 
signaling broader managerial problems in the firm; and (iii) the suggestion of 
opportunistic behavior by managers as evidenced by their efforts to increase reported 
profits using unacceptable methods, estimates or other intentional errors.  
The primary purpose of this study is to shed light on the existence of these factors 
and their relative contribution to the market’s reaction by focusing on market reactions to 
restatement announcements where not all three factors are present simultaneously. 
Specifically, we assess market reactions to announcements of income-increasing 
                                                 
1Kinney and McDaniel (1989), DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991), Feroz, Park and Pastena (1991), Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1996), Beneish (1997), Griffin, Grundfest and Perino (2001), Palmrose, Richardson 
and Scholtz (2001), Turner, Dietrich, Anderson and Bailey (2001), Richardson, Tuna, and Wu (2002) and 
Wu (2002). 
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restatements due to errors and compare them to income-decreasing restatements and to 
income-increasing restatements due to changes in accounting principles. We also assess 
changes in earnings and cash flows from the period before the restatement to the period 
of the restatement, and compare the financial performance of restating firms relative to 
their industry peers. Separate evidence is presented regarding “legitimate” restatements – 
those due to changes in accounting principles as well as “illegitimate” restatements that 
are caused by accounting errors or misapplication of accounting standards.  
 This study finds that the market reaction to announcements of income-increasing 
restatements due to errors is not statistically different from zero. Since we find that the 
cash flows for such firms improve significantly over the three-year period prior to the 
restatement, both in absolute terms and relative to industry peers, managerial 
opportunistic behavior is not at issue. Rather, the evidence suggests that the two other 
factors act in opposition to each other. Specifically, the accounting/operating system 
breakdown inherent in the error restatement appears to offset potential positive revisions 
in future cash flows, yielding an insignificant market reaction.2 Our results also show that 
market reactions to announcements of income-increasing restatements due to changes in 
accounting principle are not statistically different from zero. Since there is no breakdown 
in the accounting system for restatement arising out of changes in accounting principle 
and since we present evidence consistent with managerial opportunistic behavior for 
these restating firms, the insignificant market reaction suggests that the upward revisions 
in future cash flow expectations for these income-increasing announcements just offset 
the negative effects of managerial opportunistic behavior.  
                                                 
2 Another possible explanation is that there is no effect on the expected cash flows and the “system 
breakdown” is perceived to be an innocent non-recurring incident. 
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While this study confirms the general apprehension financial statement users have 
towards restatements, it also points out that restatements do not always have negative 
effects on income, are not always motivated by declining cash flows or profits, and are 
not necessarily associated with significant negative market reactions. This suggests that 
investors and other financial statement users should carefully examine the specific 
context of the restatement, and analyze its potential motivations before taking action. 
 
2. Restatement Types  
There are two broad scenarios under GAAP that require the restatement of 
financial statements, namely, changes in accounting principle and accounting errors.3 
Specifically, APB Opinion No. 20 (APB, 1971) requires the restatement of financial 
statements in five situations involving changes in accounting principle: a change from 
LIFO inventory valuation to another method; a change in the method of accounting for 
long-term construction-type contracts; a change to or from the full-cost method of 
accounting in the extractive industries; issuance of financial statements by a (closely 
held) company for the first time to obtain additional equity capital, to effect a business 
combination, or to register securities; and a new accounting pronouncement recommends 
that a change in accounting principle be treated retroactively. Under APB 20, accounting 
errors are treated as prior period adjustments, so comparative financial statements are 
restated. Accounting errors include mathematical mistakes, oversights, changes from 
accounting principles that are not in accordance with GAAP, changes in estimates not 
                                                 
3Financial statements are also restated when there is a change in entity such as a pooling of interest or a 
change in the companies (subsidiaries) included in the combined (consolidated) financial statements. In 
addition, companies must restate their financial statements when discontinuing business segments. These 
restatements are not included in our sample. 
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prepared in good faith, misuse of facts and misclassifications. 
 Accounting errors are clearly of concern to the firm’s stakeholders, and to 
regulators such as the SEC, especially if the error appears to be a premeditated attempt by 
management to mislead some if not all of the firm’s stakeholders. Changes in accounting 
principle that lead to restatements are less likely to be an indication of earnings 
management. First, many if not most changes in accounting principle arise out of a 
legitimate requirement to disclose changing circumstances that may affect the firm’s 
performance. Second, even if changes in accounting principle are used to manage the 
firm’s earnings, earnings management is not necessarily pernicious since it may be one 
means of providing capital markets with information about the firm’s future prospects.4 
On the other hand, to the extent that earnings are managed to mislead stakeholders or are 
perceived as such, changes in accounting principle, like accounting errors, may have 
negative implications about the firm’s future performance as compared with prior 
performance. Evidence on whether restatements are caused by managerial opportunistic 
behavior can be gleaned from comparisons of restatements due to changes of accounting 
principles and those due to accounting errors. 
 
3. The Sample 
 The sample was obtained by downloading all 10-K reports for the years 1986 to 
2001 where the word “restatement” appears within three words of "financ" (short version 
of financial, finance, etc.). The sample was then limited to include all companies that 
restated their financial statements due to accounting errors or changes in accounting 
                                                 
4 Schipper (1989), Healy and Whalen (1999), Dechow and Skinner (2000) and Parfet (2000). 
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principle. Accounting restatements because of changes in accounting principle arising out 
of new accounting standards or new SOPs were excluded because these are not under 
management discretion.5  Restatement announcement dates were obtained from company 
related news articles using Lexis-Nexis. If the restatement announcement date could not 
be found from news articles, the filing date (the date on which the restated 10-K was 
submitted to the SEC, and presumably the date it became public) of the first 10-K that 
discusses the restatement was used instead. 
 The final sample comprises 695 restatements due to accounting errors and 165 
due to changes in principle. The sample is further broken down by the specific reason for 
the restatement (see Table 1). Thirteen categories of restatement were defined based on 
the reason for the restatement, four involving changes in principle and nine involving 
accounting errors. Given the importance of revenues to firm value, we separate revenue 
related errors into two categories: restatements due to revenue errors alone and 
restatements due to revenue errors and other errors. Otherwise, restatements involving 
multiple accounting errors of more than one category are included in the catchall category 
“other errors.” The compensation error category consists primarily of restatements arising 
out of the failure to account properly for stock awards and stock options. The categories 
denoted “errors related to other income statement items” and “errors related primarily to 
balance sheet accounts” are defined by their description in the 10-K report.6 Errors 
                                                 
5 Several new SOP's during the sample period included revenue recognition and in-process R&D. 
 
6 While from a double-entry bookkeeping perspective the error may concurrently involve both the income 
statement and the balance sheet, if the 10-K report states, for instance, that the error entails the 
underreporting of an expense item, then the error is categorized as an “other income statement” error rather 
than as a “balance-sheet” error. The assumption underlying this approach is that the manner in which the 
error is reported in the 10-K not only reflects the genesis of the error but also provides potential information 
to the market about management’s incentive to err. 
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related to mergers and acquisitions consist primarily of errors related to the allocation of 
the purchase price. Innocent errors are cases of mathematical or computational error.  
Table 1 shows that the largest category of restatements arising out of changes in 
accounting principle are changes from LIFO (46.1%) followed by changes to or from full 
cost to successful efforts (23.0%). The largest accounting error categories, excluding the 
“other error” category, involve income statement accounts, namely, accounting errors 
involving only revenues (19.0%), errors related to revenues and other items (17.1%), and 
errors related to other income statement items (16.9%). These three categories cover over 
50% of sample restatements due to accounting errors. Untabulated results indicate that 
companies that commit accounting errors, especially errors involving revenues and 
mergers and acquisitions, are younger by comparison to companies that restate because of 
a change in accounting principle. This suggests that companies in their initial growth 
phase are more likely either to manipulate their accounts, especially revenues, possibly to 
mitigate negative earnings and cash flows, or to suffer from inadequate managerial 
controls during their growth stages.7 
 Table 1 also shows the distribution of the sample restatements by year and by 
category. The year is defined as the year of the restatement announcement date. The 
sample comprised of changes in accounting principle shows cyclical behavior with an 
overall increasing trend. In contrast, the sample of accounting errors shows an almost 
                                                 
7 See also Table 4 below. For other evidence that growth and age help to characterize error restating firms, 
see Beneish (1997), Callen, Segal and Robb (2003) and Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002).  See Kinney and 
McDaniel (1989) and DeFond and Jiambalvo (1991), for contrary evidence in the case of growth. 
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monotonic sharply increasing trend until 1999.8 The reason for the limited number of 
restatement cases for both samples in 2000 and in 2001 is probably that Lexis did not 
update all the 10-K cases for those years. 
 As far as changes in accounting principle are concerned, only changes from LIFO 
show a clear upward trend (until 1999).9 In contrast, the data indicate a sharp upward 
trend in accounting errors of all types, but especially errors involving revenues, errors 
involving other income statement items, errors related to mergers and acquisitions, errors 
related to balance sheet accounts, and other errors.10 Untabulated results show that a 
significant proportion of the restatements due to accounting errors occurred in the 
software and the electronic (and electric) equipment manufacturers industries. 
 Restatements are often followed by or initiated by regulatory involvement, 
primarily of the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Untabulated results show 
that changes in accounting principle rarely result in SEC involvement. In contrast, SEC 
involvement is ubiquitous in the case of accounting errors. Out of the 695 accounting 
errors in our sample, 181 or 30.2% led to or were generated by SEC involvement. 
Moreover, SEC involvement increased quite dramatically from 1996 to 1999, especially 
for the revenue error categories. Indeed, we find that restatements involving revenues had 
a 57% chance of SEC involvement, whereas the likelihood of SEC involvement for each 
of the other categories was 11% or less. 
 Table 2 provides information about the frequency of restatements as a percentage 
                                                 
8 Unlike restatements arising out of changes in accounting principle, the trend in accounting error 
restatements is widely documented. See Turner et al (2001), for example. 
9 Most LIFO changes were to FIFO – out of the total number of LIFO restatements, 69 involved changes to 
FIFO and 7 involved changes to other methods. 
10 Note again that the data for 1999-2001 may not be complete because some firms may have delayed the 
submission of the restated 10-K. 
 8
of all firms covered by Compustat. Prior to 1996, the number of restatements in our 
sample constitutes less than 1% of all firms listed on Compustat. This ratio increases 
subsequently, reaching 1.77% in 1998. When computing the ratio of restatements to the 
number of companies in the same 4-digit SIC industry on Compustat, we find the ratio 
increasing through 1998, reaching over 2% in 1997-1999. These findings indicate that 
restatements, while infrequent, involve a not insignificant proportion of firms, and are 
comparable in frequency to other extreme events such as audit qualifications, auditor 
changes and bankruptcies. 
 
4. The Impact of Restatements on Net Income 
 Table 3 (Panel A) shows the number of restatements broken down by the sign of 
their effect on net income, as well as by restatement category. Restatements defined as 
having a zero change effect on net income either had no effect on net income, or the 
effect could not be determined from the available data. Abstracting from zero-effect 
earnings restatements, Table 3 (Panel A) shows that approximately 20% of all 
restatements had a positive effect on net income, with 40% of changes in accounting 
principle and 15% of accounting errors resulting in income increasing restatements. 
Palmrose, Richardson and Scholtz (2001) report that 35% of all restatements in their 
sample are income increasing, a greater proportion than in our sample. However, their 
sample selection process involves (among other criteria) targeting companies with 
restatements due to changes in accounting for In-Process-R&D (IPRD). Such 
restatements (which accounted for 23% of the Palmrose and Scholz (2000) original 
sample) are primarily income-increasing restatements. Our sample selection process 
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excludes companies that changed their accounting for IPRD since these changes are not 
discretionary.11 
 Table 3 (Panel B) shows that revenue and compensation expense restatements 
yield the smallest proportion of positive accounting error restatements relative to the total 
number of restatements, whereas M&A related errors exhibit the largest proportion of 
positive restatements (27%).  
 Table 4 shows the cumulative effect of the restatements on net income over a 
three-year period (scaled by total assets in the year prior to the restatement announcement 
date) categorized by the reason for the restatement.12 The revenue restatements have the 
greatest negative impact on net income-- on average – 11% and – 6.4% of total assets. 
Excluding the catchall “other errors” category, the next largest impact on net income 
derives from balance sheet errors and other income statement errors, – 5.3% and – 4.4%, 
respectively. The effect is typically small and oftentimes close to zero for the other 
categories, especially for changes in accounting principle.  
 Untabulated results show that the effect of restatement on net income is generally 
negative for both SEC and non-SEC cases across all categories. However, contrary to our 
prior intuition, there appears to be little difference between the effects on net incomes of 
SEC cases relative to non-SEC cases. In fact, non-SEC cases had a greater negative effect 
on net incomes than SEC cases for a number of categories. Only when the accounting 
errors are due to revenues alone, does SEC involvement result in a substantially larger 
negative impact on cumulative net income by comparison to non-SEC cases.  
                                                 
11 Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) also exclude these data. 
 
12 The table shows the results for the restatement cases for which we found Compustat data item 6 (total 
assets).  Turner et al (2001) and Palmrose and Scholz (2002) also provide data concerning the effect on net 
income of accounting error restatements but not by the categories listed in this study.  
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5. Restatements and Financial Statement Performance 
The earnings management literature suggests that opportunistic managers 
manipulate earnings in order to mask poor performance by selecting income-increasing 
accounting methods and estimates.13 Since income-decreasing restatements due to 
accounting errors may indicate opportunistic behavior by managers, we should be able to 
determine whether restatements are due to earnings management, by comparing the 
performance of restating firms prior to and during the period affected by the restatement 
using the restated financial information.14,15 Specifically, if earnings management is the 
primary motivation for the overly aggressive accounting methods leading to restatements 
or the change in accounting method, then we should observe for the income decreasing 
restatement cases that firm performance deteriorated during the restatement period from 
the prior period, either in absolute terms or relative to the performance of other 
companies in the same industry.16 In contrast, we should not observe declining 
performance for firms with income-increasing error restatements since the latter reported 
lower income during the restatement period.  
                                                 
13 Another motivation for managers to manipulate earnings is to smooth earnings, usually by accrual 
manipulation. One common method for accrual manipulation is through changes in estimates. Changes in 
estimates, however, are not considered errors and therefore do not require restatement of financial 
statements. 
 
14 Note that when comparing the performance of the restating firms across periods (in Table 5 below) we 
are forced to use a two-tail test. For instance, suppose that the firm inflated its revenues and was forced to 
restate them. One cannot know a priori whether the inflated revenues are larger than the revenues reported 
in the pre-restatement period. Even though the inflated revenues are larger than the true revenues, the 
inflated revenues may be still lower than the revenues reported in the pre-restatement period. 
 
15 We repeated the analysis using pre-restatement data. The results are qualitatively the same. 
16 This is consistent with the Callen, Robb and Segal (2003). They provide evidence of ex ante revenue 
management by restatement firms that have suffered a string of losses. Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) 
and Richardson, Tuna and Wu (2002) also provide evidence that capital market pressures, such as the 
desire to attract external financing, induce earnings management via aggressive accounting.  
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We focus on two performance variables, net operating cash flow and net income 
before extraordinary items.17 We calculate the 3-year sum of each of these performance 
measures and divide it by the 3-year sum of total assets. We examine these ratios in the 
three-year period prior to the restatement and for the period covered by the restatement.  
For example, if the company filed the restated 10-K for 1995-1997 in 1998, we examine 
the performance in the periods 1992-1994 (prior to the restatement) and 1995-1997 
(during the restatement).  
 Panel A of Table 5 shows the means of the two performance measures for three 
categories of restatements, those due to changes in accounting methods, those due to 
accounting errors, and for the entire sample. It also shows the income-increasing and 
income-decreasing restatements separately. As can be seen from the table, both for 
restatements due to errors and for changes in accounting principles, the ROA deteriorated 
from the three-year period prior to the restatement to the period covered by the 
restatement. The positive restatements panel shows that there is no difference in ROA 
and OCF before and during the restatement. However, for the income decreasing 
restatements we find that both ROA and OCF during the restatement period are 
significantly lower. These findings are consistent with earnings management as the 
primary driver for the overly aggressive accounting method or the change in accounting 
method.  
 Panel B of Table 5 contrasts the performance measures of restating firms and the 
median firm in their 2-digit SIC industry. As the table indicates, the entire sample of 
                                                 
17 Note that the analysis in this paper is based on financial statement data as reported by the firm prior to 
restatement. Compustat does not change the original data after the restatement. Although Compustat does 
provide additional information about restated income, we cannot use these data because they may include 
the effects of subsequent restatements, accounting changes, acquisitions and divestitures. 
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error-related restating firms had significantly lower levels of operating cash flows and 
lower ROA in the three-year period prior to the restatement relative to their industry 
peers, and also in the period of the restatement. For firms with error-related income-
decreasing restatements, we find lower operating cash flows than their industry peers 
during the period of restatement but not in the period prior to the restatement period. In 
addition, the ROA is lower than their industry peers’ ROA both prior to and during the 
period of restatement, but the difference in ROA (between the restating firms and the 
industry peers) is greater during the period of restatement. These findings point to the 
deterioration in financial performance of firms with error-related income decreasing 
restatements, as both the restating firm’s cash flows and profitability have decreased 
relative to their industry peers in the period of restatement. Hence, these findings also 
suggest that the primary motive for the change in accounting method and the earnings 
manipulation is to mask poor financial performance. 
 In the case of income-increasing restatement, where opportunistic managerial 
behavior is not expected (barring potential “big bath” behavior), we find that OCF in the 
period of the restatement is not significantly different from the median OCF in the 
industry, but the industry adjusted OCF prior to the restatement is negative and 
significant. The industry adjusted ROA is negative and significant both in the period prior 
to and of the restatement. These findings suggest that for the income-increasing 
restatements there was no deterioration in financial performance during the restatement 
period and perhaps even an improvement if we look at cash flows. 
Summarizing these results, we find that firms that restated their income 
downwards experienced deteriorating financial performance both compared to their past 
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performance and to their industry peers, and therefore, this evidence is consistent with 
managerial opportunistic behavior. Firms that restated their income upwards did not 
experience deteriorating financial performance. In the next section, we examine the 
market reactions to these announcements.  
 
 
6. Market Reactions 
 Table 6 reports the size-adjusted returns for the three-day window centered on 
the announcement date of the restatement. To calculate the size-adjusted returns, each 
individual return is assigned to a size decile (based on market value of equity) and the 
equally-weighted average size-decile return is subtracted from it. As can be seen in the 
table, and consistent with many prior studies referenced above, market reaction to the 
average error restatement is negative and significantly different from zero. In contrast, the 
average market reaction to the announcement of restatements arising out of changes in 
accounting principle is not significantly different from zero. The table further breaks 
down the market reactions to income-increasing and income decreasing restatements. It 
reports market reactions that are insignificantly different from zero for income-increasing 
restatements, both for accounting errors and changes in accounting principle.18 In 
contrast, market reactions are negative and significant for income-decreasing error 
announcements, but insignificantly different from zero for income-decreasing 
restatements due to changes of accounting principle. 
 These results are consistent with the following conjectures: 
                                                 
18 This is consistent with Kinney and McDaniel (1989) and Palmrose et al (2001) in the case of accounting 
errors. 
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1. The market reacts negatively and significantly to income-decreasing 
restatements due to errors, most probably because all three potential 
factors underlying the market reaction to restatements are present and 
pointing in the same negative direction. In particular, there are likely 
negative future cash flow implications, indications that the accounting 
systems (and potentially other operations) are weak, and indications (as we 
saw in Table 5) of managerial opportunistic behavior in attempting to 
increase income. 
2. The market does not react negatively to income-increasing restatements 
due to errors, probably because failure in the accounting systems (and 
other operations), as evidenced by the restatement error, just offsets but 
does not outweigh the potential positive future cash flow implications of 
the upward income restatements. Note that in this case we do not suspect 
managers of opportunistic behavior, because income was not significantly 
lower during the restatement period relative to the prior period or relative 
to industry peers. (See Table 5). Thus, only two of the three factors are 
present here – weaknesses in the accounting systems (expected to 
negatively affect prices) and the (positive) revisions in future cash flows. 
3. The market seems not to penalize firms than engage in income-increasing 
restatements through changes in accounting methods, although the 
evidence reported in Table 5 for these firms indicates potential 
opportunistic behavior by managers. Apparently, the negative effects of 
this opportunistic behavior are offset by upward revisions in future cash 
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flow expectations since weakness in the accounting system is not an issue 
here.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
 
 This study investigates the potential factors that may affect perceptions of 
investors and other financial statement users upon the announcement of restatements of 
previously issued financial statements. We posit three such potential factors: (i) 
weaknesses in the accounting systems (and possibly operational systems as well), (ii) 
future cash flow implications of the newly restated information, and (iii) opportunistic 
managerial behavior as evidenced by the attempt to report higher profits than warranted. 
Of these three factors, we are able to provide direct evidence only regarding opportunistic 
managerial behavior by comparing income during the restatement period to the prior 
period and to the income of company peers; evidence of lower profits is consistent with 
opportunistic managerial behavior. However, by investigating restatements where not all 
three factors are present, we are able to shed some light, albeit indirectly, on the relative 
importance of these factors. This is done by examining market reactions to income-
increasing restatements due to errors and to changes in accounting principle. 
 Consistent with the literature, we find that when all three factors are likely to be 
present, that is, in cases of income-decreasing restatements due to errors, market reactions 
are significantly negative. In contrast, when only two of the three factors are likely to be 
present, market reactions are insignificant. In particular, in the case of income-increasing 
restatements due to accounting errors, only two factors are likely present, the upward 
revisions in cash flows and the weaknesses in accounting (and operating) systems that led 
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to the errors. Opportunistic managerial behavior is unlikely to be present because income 
does not differ significantly from the prior period or from industry peers. The 
insignificant market reaction in this case suggests that the signal conveyed by the 
restatement concerning the weakness in the accounting system offsets but does not 
outweigh the potential upward revisions in cash flows. A similar analysis holds when 
firms restate their financial statements by making (legitimate) changes of accounting 
principle. Here weakness in the accounting system is not at issue. Rather, when these 
restatements increase income, the potential factors at work are upward revisions in future 
cash flow expectations and opportunistic managerial behavior, as evidenced by 
deterioration in cash flows over time and relative to peers. The insignificant market 
reaction in this case suggests that opportunistic managerial behavior just offsets but does 
not outweigh upward revisions in future cash flow expectations.  
 Overall, the evidence provided in this study suggests that investors, creditors, and 
other financial statement users should carefully analyze the specific restatement 
announcement, and assess the potential existence and direction of the three factors 
posited in this study in order to determine the market impact of the restatement. Our 
results indicate that these factors do not always act in tandem and that there may be 
tradeoffs among them. As a consequence, while the market often reacts negatively to the 
announcements of restatements, this is not always the case. Indeed, we have shown that 
there are classes of restatements where not all three factors apply and those that do appear 
to offset each other. Knowledge concerning the context of the restatement and the 
potential factors underlying the restatement are potentially crucial inputs for investors and 
other stakeholders of the firm in their decision making processes. 
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Table 1: Restatements by Year and Reason for the Restatement 
 
Reason 
Year 110 120 130 140 Total 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 Total
1986 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1987 3 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 4
1988 4 2 0 1 7 3 1 0 0 2 0 4 1 2 13
1989 0 1 0 4 5 2 1 0 2 1 0 1 2 2 11
1990 2 1 0 2 5 4 2 1 0 3 0 2 2 1 15
1991 4 5 0 2 11 1 3 0 0 4 0 2 2 1 13
1992 5 5 1 1 12 3 4 1 1 4 0 1 2 5 21
1993 5 1 1 2 9 5 5 0 0 2 2 4 2 7 27
1994 7 2 2 1 12 4 11 1 2 4 1 4 3 3 33
1995 4 4 2 1 11 6 5 1 3 4 2 5 0 13 39
1996 8 2 2 6 18 16 7 6 4 7 1 10 1 10 62
1997 11 3 5 2 21 27 11 6 3 12 4 10 1 16 90
1998 13 9 2 1 25 26 23 5 1 23 11 7 0 25 121
1999 5 2 3 4 14 17 19 6 4 23 14 12 2 26 123
2000 5 0 4 2 11 16 24 8 1 20 8 13 2 15 107
2001 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 0 2 1 6 0 2 16
                               
Total 76 38 22 29 165 132 119 36 21 112 44 83 20 128 695
% of 
Total 46% 23% 13% 18% 100% 19% 17% 5% 3% 16% 6% 12% 3% 18% 100%
 
1XX - Change in Accounting Policy: 
110 - Change from LIFO  
120 - FULL to SUCCESSFUL EFFORT and vice versa 
130 - Change in REVENUE RECOGNITION policy 
140 - OTHER changes in accounting method 
  
2XX - Errors: 
201 - Errors involving revenues only 
202 - Errors involving revenues and other items 
203 – Errors related to compensation expense 
204 – Errors related to capitalization and expensing 
205 – Errors related to other income statement items 
206 – Errors related to application of accounting for mergers and acquisitions 
207 – Errors related primarily to balance sheet accounts 
208 – Innocent Errors 
209 - Other Errors  
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Table 2 
Pervasiveness of Restatement Cases   
 
Year N By Year By 4-digit SIC  
    RES_FREQ ERR_FREQ RES_FREQ ERR_FREQ 
1986 5298 0.02% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 
1987 5113 0.14% 0.08% 0.20% 0.11% 
1988 5323 0.38% 0.24% 0.70% 0.34% 
1989 5237 0.31% 0.21% 0.37% 0.27% 
1990 5250 0.38% 0.29% 0.50% 0.43% 
1991 5276 0.45% 0.25% 0.63% 0.42% 
1992 5557 0.59% 0.38% 0.87% 0.65% 
1993 6223 0.58% 0.43% 0.87% 0.73% 
1994 6832 0.66% 0.48% 1.11% 0.81% 
1995 7217 0.69% 0.54% 1.26% 1.04% 
1996 7506 1.07% 0.83% 1.32% 0.91% 
1997 8250 1.35% 1.09% 2.01% 1.64% 
1998 8265 1.77% 1.46% 2.23% 1.61% 
1999 7878 1.74% 1.56% 2.04% 1.91% 
2000 7568 1.56% 1.41% 1.78% 1.58% 
2001 6636 0.24% 0.24% 0.20% 0.20% 
 
Notes: 
1. N is the total number of companies on Compustat 
2. RES_FREQ is the ratio of restatement cases to the total number of companies on 
Compustat (N) 
3. ERR_FREQ is the ratio of restatement cases due to errors to the total number of 
companies on Compustat (N) 
4. By Year shows the simple average of restatement cases to the number of 
companies on Compustat 
5. By 4-digit SIC columns are computed as the average (over all 4-digit SIC 
industries) of the number of restatement cases divided by the number of 
companies for each 4-digit SIC code. 
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 Table 3: Sign of the Earnings Restatement by Category 
 
Panel A 
 
 Number of 
Restatements 
Zero Change 
Earnings 
Restatements 
Negative 
Earnings 
Restatements 
Positive Earnings
Restatements 
Proportion of 
Negative 
Earnings 
Restatements* 
Proportion of 
Positive Earnings 
Restatements* 
Total 860 118 599 143 80.8% 19.2% 
Changes of 
Principle 165 24 85 56 60.3% 39.7% 
Accounting 
Errors 695 94 514 87 85.5% 14.5% 
* The proportions in the last two columns do not include zero change earnings restatements. 
 
Panel B 
 
Reason for                                     Number of Positive         Percentage of  
Restatement                                     Total Restatements         Total Restatements 
Change from LIFO 26 34% 
FULL to SUCCESSFUL EFFORT and vice versa 10 26% 
Change in REVENUE RECOGNITION policy 7 32% 
OTHER changes in accounting method 13 45% 
Errors involving revenues only 13 10% 
Errors involving revenues and other items 8 7% 
Errors related to compensation expense 2 6% 
Errors related to capitalization and expensing 4 19% 
Errors related to other income statement items 21 19% 
Errors related to application of accounting for M&A 12 27% 
Errors related primarily to balance sheet accounts 11 13% 
Innocent Errors 3 15% 
Other Errors 13 10% 
 
The table shows whether the restatement had a negative or positive (Positive Restatements) effect on 
net income. Zero change earnings restatements either had no effect on net income or the effect could 
not be determined from the available data.   
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Table 4 
Cumulative Effect of the Restatement on Net Income by Reason 
For the Restatement 
 
Reason for                                     Cumulative Effect                 Number of  
Restatement                                     of Restatements            Restatements 
Change from LIFO -0.002 64 
FULL to SUCCESSFUL EFFORT and vice versa -0.026 34 
Change in REVENUE RECOGNITION policy -0.013 21 
OTHER changes in accounting method 0.017 21 
Errors involving revenues only -0.064 113 
Errors involving revenues and other items -0.110 98 
Errors related to compensation expense -0.016 20 
Errors related to capitalization and expensing -0.006 17 
Errors related to other income statement items -0.044 77 
Errors related to application of accounting for M&A -0.022 37 
Errors related primarily to balance sheet accounts -0.053 54 
Innocent Errors -0.008 17 
Other Errors -0.060 85 
 
 
The cumulative effect of the restatements on net income is computed over a three-year period scaled 
by total assets in the year prior to the restatement announcement date. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of Financial Statement Performance Before and During the Restatement Period 
 
Panel A: All Restatements Positive Restatements Negative Restatements 
Acct. Acct.  Total Acct. Acct.  Acct. Acct.  
Variable Chg. Err.  Chg. Err. Total Chg. Err. Total 
OCF 
Before  0.01 -0.00002 0.002 -0.0004 -0.014 -0.009 0.0121 0.0019 0.0037 
OCF 
During 0.0005 -0.0024 -0.0017 0.0008 -0.003 -0.002 0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0020 
Difference -0.009 -0.0024 -0.0038 0.001 0.010 0.007 -0.0120 -0.0044 -0.0057 
t-statistic 
N 
1.99** 
86 
0.90 
297 
1.62 
383 
0.19 
26 
-1.90* 
43 
-1.49 
69 
1.82* 
49 
1.24 
229 
1.82* 
278 
ROA 
before 0.008 -0.0003 0.017 -0.0052 -0.017 -0.012 0.0083 -0.0016 0.0003 
ROA 
During -0.006 -0.06 -0.049 0.01 -0.045 -0.023 -0.014 -0.067 -0.058 
Difference -0.015 -0.06 -0.05 0.015 -0.028 -0.01 -0.022 -0.066 -0.058 
t-statistic 
N 
1.78* 
100 
5.68** 
325 
5.9** 
425 
-0.94 
31 
0.69 
46 
0.43 
77 
2.08** 
57 
5.9** 
249 
6.17** 
306 
Panel B: Differences from Industry Medians       
OCF 
Before  0.007 -0.008 -0.005 0.002 -0.017 -0.01 0.009 -0.0045 -0.0023 
t-statistic 1.80* -1.88* -1.35 0.41 -2.25** -1.90* 1.35 -0.99 -0.58 
OCF 
During 0 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.003 -0.003 
t-statistic 0.3 -3.65** -3.58** 1.76* -1.52 -1.35 0.63 -3.23** -3.27** 
ROA 
before -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.017 -0.04 -0.036 
t-statistic -2.52** -3.91** -4.38** -2.81** -1.19 -1.82* -1.53 3.8** -4.05** 
ROA 
During -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 -0.089 -0.078 
t-statistic -3.35** -7.20** -7.66** -1.56 -2.47** -2.81** -2.48** -6.71** -7.02** 
N 124 465 589 40 61 101 70 363 433 
 
Notes: 
1. OCF before (during) is the ratio of operating cash flow to total assets in the three years 
before (during) the period of the restatement. It is computed as the sum of operating cash 
flows over the three years period divided by the sum of the total assets for the same 
period. Panel B reports the ratio minus the median ratio for the 2-digit SIC industry. 
2. ROA before (during) is the ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets in 
the three years before (during) the period of the restatement. It is computed as the sum of 
the income over the three years period divided by the sum of the total assets for the same 
period. Panel B reports the ratio minus the median ratio for the 2-digit SIC industry. 
3. DIFFERENCE measures the mean difference in the performance metric from the period 
prior to the period during the restatement for all firms for which data are available for 
both periods. DIFFERENCE does not generally measure the difference between the 
reported means of the performance metric because of different sample sizes in the two 
periods.   
4. * (**) indicates a significance level of 10% (5%). 
5. N is the number of observations 
6. Total includes both error-related and accounting-change restatements cases. 
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Table 6 
Abnormal Returns in the Three-Day Event Period 
 
 
 
All 
Restatements 
Negative 
Restatements 
Positive 
Restatements
 N CAR N CAR N CAR 
Change in Accounting Policy             
Change from LIFO  67 0.003 36 -0.003 22 0.020 
FULL to SUCCESSFUL EFFORT and vice versa 35 -0.009 20 -0.001 9 -0.014* 
change in REVENUE RECOGNITION policy 21 -0.013 10 -0.045 7 0.021** 
OTHER changes in accounting method 18 0.001 6 -0.012 8 0.002 
Total 141 -0.003 72 -0.009 46 0.010 
             
Errors:             
Errors involving revenues only 109 -0.108** 89 -0.104** 8 -0.033 
Errors involving revenues and other items 100 -0.126** 86 -0.142** 8 0.017 
Errors related to compensation expense 22 -0.004 17 -0.002     
Errors related to capitalization and expensing 18 -0.043 11 -0.101 4 0.081* 
Errors related to other income statement items 78 -0.007 50 -0.002 17 -0.020 
Errors related to application of accounting for 
M&A 37 0.013 22 0.041 9 -0.014 
Errors related primarily to balance sheet accounts 61 -0.058** 38 -0.079** 9 0.003 
Innocent Errors 18 -0.075* 14 -0.072* 2 0.071 
Other Errors  80 -0.080** 58 -0.104** 12 0.010 
Total 523 -0.070** 385 -0.083** 69 0 
 
Notes: 
1. CAR is the cumulative size-adjusted returns over the three day period centered on the 
announcement date. Size-adjusted returns are cumulative returns on the firm’s stock 
minus the equally-weighted average return on all firms assigned to the same size (market 
value) decile. 
2. N is the number of restatement cases. 
3. * (**) indicates significance level of 10% (5%). 
 
